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A. Introduction 
 
When the International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute was adopted, there was hope in some quarters 
that the reparations provisions would make a difference to victims’ lives. The provisions reflected 
a new dual orientation of international criminal justice – not only retributive and perpetrator-
focussed, but also reparative, aimed at helping to address victim harms and restore dignity.1 
However, this dual orientation was controversial then and remains so today. The reparations 
mandate is not simply accepted or understood in the same way by all stakeholders inside and 
outside of the Court.2 The job of implementing reparations (as well as what one might understand 
as effective implementation) has therefore been complicated by competing visions about the main 
goals the Court should be concentrating on and how reparations fit within those goals. 
This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of reparations at the ICC. It analyses the work of 
the ICC and the Trust Fund for Victims in awarding and implementing reparations to victims. It 
considers the process as well as the outcomes on reparations in those cases where reparations 
orders have been made as well as the assistance mandate of the Trust Fund. It does not review all 
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aspects of the reparations process, but instead focuses on key trends from which patterns can be 
ascertained and goes on to consider what steps might be taken to improve effectiveness. 
The chapter concludes that the competing approaches to the purpose of reparations have 
led to vastly different perspectives on what would constitute effective reparations. These different 
perspectives have made it difficult for the Court to adopt a unified vision to improve reparations 
outcomes. The lack of unity has hampered the kind of strategic thinking and decision-making 
necessary to make reparations work effectively, taking into account the built-in constraints of the 
Statute. The more the failings become evident, the more pressure is on the system to find quick 
fixes or to narrow the objectives which ultimately reduce the prospects for effectiveness further. 
This is a cyclical problem which does not end well for the victims who continue to await – with 
growing impatience - reparations.   
Adopting a human rights based approach to effectiveness would help the Court to develop 
victim-centred thinking, which is essential for effective reparations. It would also assist to 
inculcate a culture of institutional accountability and transparency towards the victim stakeholders 
of reparations. Despite the sui generis character of ICC proceedings, recognising that victims 
should have a right to expect effective reparations procedures and clear outcomes, and that the ICC 
is accountable to deliver them, may help reorient the process.   
 
B. A Quick Stock-Taking on the Court and Reparations Proceedings 
 
There is a ‘crisis of confidence’ currently affecting the ICC, which arguably permeates the entire 
fabric of the institution, and has led four former presidents of the Court’s Assembly of States 
Parties to lament recently the ‘growing gap between the unique vision captured in the Rome 
Statute, the Court’s founding document, and some of the daily work of the Court.’ They expressed 
that they are ‘disappointed by the quality of some of its judicial proceedings, frustrated by some 
of the results, and exasperated by the management deficiencies that prevent the Court from living 
up to its full potential.’3 This crisis has come to the fore with the 12 April 2019 Pre-Trial Chamber 
decision rejecting the request of the Prosecutor to investigate alleged crimes committed in 
Afghanistan,4 partly on the basis of a contorted ruling on ‘the interests of justice’.5 It is also 
accentuated by recent acquittals (for which both the Office of the Prosecutor and the relevant 
Chambers have been blamed in equal measure),6 and the failure of many states to cooperate with 
the ICC and surrender accused persons against whom there are outstanding arrest warrants. This 
is coupled with an approach taken by the Court to immunities which according to a number of 
states, conflicts with their other obligations and ignores international law.7 
This ‘crisis of confidence’ is relevant to the question of reparations, to the extent that it 
will result in a strategic re-focusing on ‘the core mandate’8 of the ICC to get the Court ‘back on 
track’. There is a tendency to associate the ‘core mandate’ of the ICC with a narrow focus on 
prosecutions, only or mainly.9 As Vasiliev has argued in relation to the Court’s views on such 
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matters, ‘[r]estorative ambitions must be tempered in part of the core criminal process (as 
opposed to its ‘reparations add-on’) and efforts intensified to manage the expectations 
among victims and affected communities.’10 Clearly, a focus on prosecutions necessarily 
involves victims, however it is the recognition of victims’ agency and rights which has been 
perceived by some – including former Court officials11 and even some sitting judges12 - as a 
distraction and hindrance to the Court, and an impediment to achieving the “core mandate” as it 
has been narrowly perceived by them. Already, in somewhat of a response to the crisis of 
confidence, the Prosecutor, in her newest draft strategic plan, ‘embraces an approach of bringing 
cases that are more modest – either narrower in scope or against lower-level accused.’13 This may 
result in easier to achieve convictions, but it also means that fewer victims, and not necessarily 
those who suffered the most egregious forms of harm, will have access to reparations.  
Even without taking into account this wider “crisis of confidence”, a snapshot on 
reparations reveals a bleak picture. In some cases, reparations have plodded forward at a snail’s 
pace – it has taken a long time to get to a final decision on reparations, but even then, the delays 
with implementation have been significant, and quite clearly unacceptable. There are many busy 
and committed people rushing around doing a lot of work on reparations, but not much actual 
reparation has been achieved, for anyone.  
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The problem of reparations has not simply been a ‘problem’ of acquittals or limited or 
narrow prosecutions14 – it is a much more fundamental problem about the lack of a common vision 
about what successful reparations look like, and at best lukewarm commitment to doing what 
would be necessary to achieve anything beyond tokenism.   
 
C. Key Structural Challenges Associated with the Reparations System before the ICC  
 
Some of the challenges the reparations system faces today are structural and are traceable to the 
framework set out in the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.  This section provides 
an overview of this structure and identifies some of the challenges associated with it.  
A first challenge is reparations tied to individual criminal responsibility - against ‘a 
convicted person’.15 The reparations process is connected to a criminal court and reparation flows 
not just from the decisions about who to prosecute and for what crimes, but on the success of such 
prosecutions. As with the Lubanga case, if the Prosecutor narrowly frames the indictment, decides 
not to proceed with charges, or not to bring new charges to reflect evidence of additional 
criminality coming out during the trial, this will limit who is eligible for reparations.16 The 
Lubanga Appeals Chamber determined that reparations orders are intrinsically linked to the 
individual whose criminal liability is established in a conviction and whose culpability is 
determined in a sentence.17 While some authors of submissions had encouraged the Court to take 
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17 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing the principles 
and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for reparations (Annex A) and 
a broader approach to reparations,18 the Appeals Chamber held that reparations had no autonomous 
meaning outside of the conviction. In this light it held, for instance, that because they were not 
included in the sentence on guilt, sexual and gender-based violence could not be defined as a harm 
for the purposes of reparations resulting from the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was convicted.19  
Similarly, as with the Bemba case, if there is an acquittal, there will be no Court-ordered 
reparations for victims associated with those proceedings; ‘[t]he Chamber must respect the 
limitations of this Court and recalls that it can only address compensation for harm suffered as a 
result of crimes when the person standing trial … has been found guilty.’20 In the same way, the 
Kenyan post-election violence cases which ultimately collapsed or were withdrawn prior to trial 
did not and could not result in Court-ordered reparations.  
Tied to this limitation on the ‘convicted person’, is the fact that individuals who perpetrate 
international crimes rarely, if they ever, act alone.21 Their crimes are fostered by the structures 
(e.g., governments, rebel movements, criminal enterprises, companies) that provide a cushion of 
support. Even though evidence of these connections may come out during the trial, and these 
groups may have benefited financially from the commission of crimes carried out by defendants, 
the ICC may only make an award against ‘a convicted person’, and reparations orders can only be 
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enforced against convicted persons – even if those persons were associated with a governmental 
or corporate apparatus when they committed the crimes. This complicates asset recovery.22  
In dicta, chambers have commented on state responsibility. In Katanga, for example, the 
Trial Chamber reminded that reparations orders are without prejudice to the state’s responsibility 
for reparations. It ordered the Trust Fund to contact authorities in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) to discuss the state’s possible contribution to reparations and cooperation in the 
implementation of the award.23 In the Al Mahdi reparations order, the chamber indicated that ‘the 
present order does not exonerate States from their separate obligations, under domestic law or 
international treaties, to provide reparations to their citizens. Further, States Parties have the 
obligation to fully cooperate during all stages of reparations proceedings, in particular during the 
implementation phase, where their cooperation is especially necessary.’24  
The narrow focus on the convicted person is at the root of much of the discontent of victims 
on the ground, who cannot comprehend why ‘their’ crimes did not result in reparations when other 
victims’ crimes did, and why the levers of power that fostered the crimes remain untouchable.25 
Consequently, some organizations have argued that the more flexible mandate of the ICC’s Trust 
Fund for Victims should be privileged above Court-ordered reparations.26 One could take those 
arguments even further and question the utility of any reparations process inside the ICC. Is the 
rights-based approach of reparations a framework that works better with state defendants? Can 
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reparations work at all in the context of international criminal law proceedings where the lens is 
focused tightly on individual criminal responsibility?27 Might it have been more effective if the 
international community would have simply supported local reparations efforts in countries 
affected by ICC proceedings and not have gotten caught up in the intricacies of attempting to do 
reparations within the confines of criminal procedure?  
On the one hand, a separated reparations process might have helped foster more adequate 
and effective reparations that correspond to the range of victimisation in the country without being 
limited by a narrow set of crimes. Also, it might have been a way to engage the responsibility of 
states and other actors, and might have a more lasting domestic impact. On the other hand, the 
vision of an ICC as a Court with the mandate to not only prosecute perpetrators but also support 
and afford reparations to victims is inherently important. The reparative naturally and inextricably 
connects to the retributive and this should be evidenced by the proceedings.  
Furthermore, tying reparations to the ICC ensures (at least in principle if not yet in practice) 
that a modicum of reparations takes place. Past attempts to establish international trust funds to 
support reparations for victims of conflict have not succeeded. Take for example, the 
recommendation of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to set up a compensation 
commission, or the recommendation of the ICTY and ICTR presidents to establish mechanisms to 
support victims on the back of the establishment of those tribunals.28 These recommendations were 
not heeded. Similarly, the same reasons why domestic courts are deemed unable or unwilling to 
proceed with an investigation or prosecution would likely apply to domestic reparations processes 
– there is no evidence that states who lack the will or capacity to investigate or prosecute are 
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imbued with the will and capacity to establish and run effective and transparent reparations 
processes. Victims’ needs tend to be an afterthought; the incorporation of the reparations mandate 
in the ICC Statute is vital for these reasons – it should prevent victims’ needs and rights from being 
ignored.  
 
D. Issues of interpretation and implementation that are more within the control of the Court 
and/or Trust Fund 
 
An overriding challenge is the vagueness of ICC reparations provisions. In part because of the 
divergences of views amongst states at Rome, only a bare-bones framework on reparations was 
included in the Statute,29 which was only marginally expanded upon and clarified in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.30 The Court never adopted institution-wide principles on reparations to 
guide its overall work though arguably it was mandated to do so under Article 75(2).31 It opted 
instead to leave the process of clarification to individual chambers in the context of particular 
cases.32 This approach affords the different chambers flexibility to put in place procedures that 
correspond to the particular circumstances of victimisation in individual cases. However, another 
view is that the judges were simply unable to agree a common approach, and the lack of clarity 
can and has contributed to administrative delays, as predicted.33 While each chamber decides how 
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it will collect and review applications and/or how it will decide upon them, the administrative arm 
of the Court waits for instructions to organise the work. A bespoke case by case approach means 
that the Registry is limited in its ability to prepare. Also, the lack of uniformity can lead to arbitrary 
inconsistencies in approaches taken, impacting on victims’ rights and adding to the confusion for 
victims and their counsel. As victims are limited in their ability to appeal rulings that impact their 
rights (aside from a few exceptions), there is little they can do.  
Despite these overriding challenges, in practice, principles on reparations have been 
progressively adopted by the different chambers,34 and there is a slowly developing practise that 
is starting to go in a consistent direction.  
 
1. The application, verification and assessment process 
 
The Court may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine 
the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or in respect of victims and will state the 
principles on which it is acting.35 To date, both approaches have been used by the Court.  
Reparations are typically assessed in response to applications submitted by victims. Such 
applications would need to comply with the stipulations in Rule 94(1) of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence,36 but there remains a lot which is unclear in the process. The rules do not specify 
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34 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to Be 
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36 Rule 94(1) provides: ‘A victim’s request for reparations under article 75 shall be made in writing and filed with the 
Registrar. It shall contain the following particulars: (a) The identity and address of the claimant; (b) A description of 
the injury, loss or harm; (c) The location and date of the incident and, to the extent possible, the identity of the person 
or persons the victim believes to be responsible for the injury, loss or harm; (d) Where restitution of assets, property 
or other tangible items is sought, a description of them; (e) Claims for compensation; (f) Claims for rehabilitation and 
when applications should be submitted, nor what role the Registry should play in identifying 
potential applicants and collecting information. This is one area where chambers’ practice has 
varied significantly. In the earliest cases, reparations applications were received at any time, often 
well in advance of a conviction. Over time, however, early applications have been discouraged, 
perhaps with good reason, in order not to raise hopes about a reparations process until it is 
somewhat clearer that one will happen, and once it becomes clearer who may be eligible for 
reparations.37  
On occasion, the Court has determined victims’ eligibility on its own motion or has 
supplemented victim applications with an own motion “top up” approach. It has invited the 
Registry, the Trust Fund or others such as the Office of the Public Council for Victims (OPCV) to 
identify potential beneficiaries of reparations. While this has ultimately helped to provide a more 
holistic picture, the ad hoc approaches to beneficiary identification employed by different 
chambers have arguably heightened unpredictability.38  
For instance, different approaches have been taken by chambers in respect to whether 
reparations awards should be restricted to, or should privilege, individuals that submitted 
applications for reparations. The distinctions impact fundamentally victims’ access to justice and 
underscore how judges and others understand the purpose of reparations within the ICC system. 
As the approach of the chambers is not known in advance, some victims may be caught out by 
surprise and closed out of processes. As Delagrange noted in 2018, ‘[p]resently it is still unclear 
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38 See, REDRESS, ‘No Time to Wait: Realising Reparations for Victims before the International Criminal Court’, 
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whether individual victims are de facto required to request reparations during the proceedings in 
order to be considered as potential beneficiaries.’39 This remains unclear.  
In the Lubanga case, the Trial Chamber refused to consider the individual applications that 
had already been filed which gave expression to victims’ views on appropriate forms of 
reparations. This failure to take into account the applications was not overruled by the Appeals 
Chamber. Instead, the Trial Chamber tasked with overseeing the implementation of reparations in 
the case ordered the Trust Fund to identify additional victims who could potentially be eligible for 
collective reparations.40 In the Katanga case, the Trial Chamber decided to restrict the beneficiaries 
to those who had already submitted individual applications.41 In this case the identity of the victims 
was relatively well-known, given that it concerned attacks on a single village on a single day; 
perhaps that explains the Court’s narrow focus on beneficiaries that had already been determined 
through the application process, though this is not expressly stated by the chambers. The facts were 
very different in the Bemba case, which involved a much more complicated crime context and a 
wider array of victims. Despite these differences, the group of experts advising on reparations 
surprisingly recommended that the Chamber restrict itself to individuals who had already 
submitted applications at the time of its review.42 This approach was recommended mainly on the 
grounds of expediency, even though it could not have been clear at the time that community 
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the International Criminal Court’, (2018) 18(3) Intl Crim L Rev 540, 548. 
40 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ‘Corrected version of the “Decision Setting the Size of the Reparations 
Award for which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is Liable”,’ ICC-01/04-01/06-3379-Red-Corr-tENG, 21 December 2017. 
41 Katanga reparations order (n 23), para. 43. 
42 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Expert Report on Reparation, ‘Public Redacted Version of “Annex, 
28 November 2017, ICC-01/05- 01/08-3575-Conf-Exp-Anx-Corr2”,’ ICC-01/05-01/08-3575-Anx-Corr2-Red 30-11-
2017, 28 November 2017,  (“Bemba expert report”) paras. 41 – 51. 
outreach on application processes and deadlines had been effective, and consequently it would 
have been likely that some of the most vulnerable victims would be excluded.43  
The experts suggested an exception – the deadline should be extended for surviving victims 
of rape and children born of rape, deemed by the group of experts to be ‘among the most serious 
crimes with particularly severe consequences for the victims.’44 While any extension clearly would 
have been helpful, the rationale for this particular exception was not clear, coming without a fuller 
evaluation of harms. In the end, this ultimately became moot when Bemba was acquitted and the 
reparations process shut down. Nevertheless, the experts’ approach remains on the table. In Al 
Mahdi, the Trial Chamber held that individual reparations should be determined ‘on the basis of 
the extent of the harm suffered or sacrifice made, rather than solely on whether a victim had applied 
for reparations’.45 Thus here, like in the Lubanga case, there was a need to identify new potential 
beneficiaries. 
A separate concern is the Registry’s hands-off approach when assisting victims to apply 
and helping to address evidentiary gaps with their applications. The Victim Participation and 
Reparations Section (VPRS) of the Registry is responsible for supplying and collecting victims’ 
application forms and assisting victims to supply any additional or missing information,46 though 
their role has been relatively hands-off. Experience from domestic and international mass claims 
processes makes clear that an active Registry that supports victims’ efforts to substantiate their 
                                                        
43 See, the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Ivica Kevesevic v. the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, CH/97/46, 10 September 1998. The applicant was arbitrarily deprived of his right to reclaim 
his right to occupy his pre-war apartment because of the operation of an unrealistic time period in which he could 
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44 Bemba expert report (n 42), para. 48. 
45 Al Mahdi reparations order (n 24), para. 78. 
46 ICC Regulations of the Court, 88(2). 
claims and connects the minimal evidence they might have to other sources that might be easier 
for the Registry to collect and manage, is essential to the reparations process.47 However, the worry 
that to be active would somehow impede defence rights has led to an overly cautious approach by 
the different chambers. Arguably, it should have been possible for the Court to separate out the 
prosecution and reparation phases of proceedings more clearly - only the former impacting on the 
presumption of innocence – so that Registry or Secretariat support to the latter phase would not 
lead to bias or the appearance of bias impacting the presumption of innocence. At the least, in 
circumstances where it is clear that the funds for reparations would be coming from the Trust Fund 
as opposed to the convicted perpetrator, there is no reason why the Registry could not be more 
actively engaged.   
 
2. The types of reparations awards that can be adopted 
 
Article 75 of the ICC Statute enables the ICC to order reparations to, or in respect of, victims, 
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. The listing of three different forms of 
possible reparations and the ability for the Court to provide individual or collective reparations or 
both, were intended to enable the Court to respond effectively to the different kind of situations 
coming before it. Nevertheless, the focus on restitution, compensation and rehabilitation is 
narrower than the framework for reparations that has progressively come to be accepted under 
human rights law, which in addition to the three forms listed in Article 75, also include satisfaction 
and guarantees of non-repetition.48  Presumably, this distinction stems from the ability of the ICC 
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December 2005.  
only to make awards against convicted individual perpetrators (as opposed to States or other 
entities). Arguably, it would be difficult for an individual perpetrator to be ordered to take 
measures of satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition – measures typically associated with state 
responsibility and usually – though not exclusively – implemented by a state.   
Nonetheless, in some of the reparations judgments to date, the Court has sought to 
incorporate measures of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition into its rulings.49 In the Al 
Mahdi reparations order, the chambers indicated that: 
Reparations in the present case are designed – to the extent achievable – to relieve the 
suffering caused by the serious crime committed, address the consequences of the wrongful 
act committed by Mr Al Mahdi, enable victims to recover their dignity and deter future 
violations. Reparations may also assist in promoting reconciliation between the victims of 
the crime, the affected communities and the convicted person.50 
 
In the Katanga case, Germain Katanga withdrew his conviction appeal and issued a video 
statement of regret.51 The expression of regret might have been an important measure of 
satisfaction for certain victims, however in arguments put before the chamber, victims’ legal 
representatives explained the apology was premature: it is ‘at odds with a fundamental principle 
in Hema culture, according to which a person who has done someone harm must make amends 
before he or she makes an apology.’52 That the apology came before victims received reparations 
was understood as highly problematic. While the Bogoro victims still await the implementation of 
collective reparations, Germain Katanga’s apology seems to have served him well. The Prosecutor 
decided not to pursue a cross appeal on the judgment to contest Katanga’s acquittal on rape and 
sexual slavery charges, taking into account, amongst other factors, ‘Germain Katanga’s expression 
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51 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Defence Notice of Discontinuance of Appeal’, ICC-01/04-01/07-3497, 7 
March 2014, paras.1-4. A later video apology is at: Annex 2 to ‘Defence Submission of a Video Recording of Mr 
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52 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, ‘Legal Representative’s observations on the reduction of sentence of Germain 
Katanga’, ICC-01/04-01/07-3597-tENG, 18 September 2015, para. 54. 
of sincere regret to all those who have suffered as a result of his conduct, including the victims of 
Bogoro’.53 Much more promising, the Chamber sought to build upon the Defence Counsel’s 
statement that Katanga was willing to assist. In the reparations order, the Chamber directed the 
Defence ‘to approach the TFV so as to discuss the contribution of Mr Katanga, should that be his 
desire, to the modalities of reparations, which for instance, could be by way of a letter of apology, 
public apologies, or the holding of a ceremony of reconciliation once he has served his sentence.’54 
How this might work, now that Katanga is no longer in the custody of the ICC remains unclear. 
 
Individual and/or collective forms of reparation 
The Court can award both individual and collective forms of reparations. In essence, individual 
awards are directed at particular persons - individual victims. They might address actual 
quantifiable losses or more often in cases involving large numbers of persons, they may provide 
for some form of standardised payment or other benefit to individuals. Collective awards are likely 
to be made up of symbolic or commemorative awards, cy pres remedies or assistance programmes 
benefiting large numbers of individuals or entire communities of victims.55  
The ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are vague in their identification of 
the factors which should determine whether an award is individual or collective or both.56 
Arguably, too little emphasis has been placed on what victims themselves want, whether for 
reasons of perceived efficiency or possible paternalism – that the Court or Trust Fund is somehow 
better placed to understand their needs. In the Lubanga case, this way of working led to an award 
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54 Katanga reparations order (n 23), para 318 
55 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 97–98. 
56 Rules of Procedure and Evidence 97(1), 98(3) and (4). 
which arguably bore too little correlation with the harm suffered or victims’ submissions about 
needs and circumstances. Though many victims submitted applications for individual reparations, 
the Trial Chamber favoured ‘community-based’ reparations recommended by the Trust Fund for 
Victims, which, it held ‘would be more beneficial and have greater utility than individual awards, 
given the limited funds available and the fact that this approach does not require costly and 
resource intensive verification procedures.’57 The Appeals Chamber largely affirmed the Trial 
Chamber’s approach.58 It held that ‘when only collective reparations are awarded pursuant to rule 
98 (3) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, a Trial Chamber is not required to rule on the merits 
of the individual requests for reparations.’59 It determined that applicants did not have an intrinsic 
right to have their applications considered individually. In reaching its decision, it noted that the 
applicants had included submissions relating to both individual and collective awards.60 Moffett 
comments on the impact of the failure of the Court to account for victims’ needs and preferences, 
ultimately reducing the effectiveness of reparations: 
 
victims argued against community reparations on the grounds that the community 
“accepted this behaviour [the recruitment and use of child soldiers in the conflict] for the 
most part and supported the leaders who engaged in it. Many even collaborated.” 
Accordingly, reparations ordered on a community-basis do not directly remedy the harm 
suffered by victims, and portrays the Court’s reparation regime as symbolic. This may be 
the result of the judges in the Lubanga case interpreting the ICC reparations regime as 
serving a more reconciliation or restorative purpose than a remedial one, owing to the 
defendant being indigent, difficulties in ordering individual reparations to child soldiers of 
one community in Ituri, and having to rely on the Trust Fund for Victims. The judges may 
also be trying to overcome the shortcomings of the criminal trial and its limited charges by 
maximising the scope of beneficiaries of reparations to the community rather than specific 
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58 Lubanga Reparations Appeal (n 17), para. 214. 
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individuals. Nonetheless, such an approach reduces the meaningfulness and effectiveness 
of reparations in responding to the needs of those most affected by these crimes.61 
 
The application process for reparations has been mainly individualised (with some variance in the 
approaches taken by chambers). An individual application process in which persons identify and 
quantify the harms they suffered and which then results in no consideration of the individual 
applications appears inefficient and a waste of victims’ and others’ time.  
In the Katanga62 and Al Mahdi63 cases, reparations awards included both individual and 
collective elements; indeed in the Al Mahdi case, individual reparations awards for both economic 
loss and moral damage were prioritised, to the extent that they would not hinder reconciliation or 
result in the stigmatisation of individuals in the community.64 With Katanga, perhaps because there 
were a finite number of victims, but also because of the submissions made by victims which 
clarified that they did not see themselves as part of a collective,65 and in which they 
overwhelmingly expressed their preference for obtaining financial compensation to help them 
address the harm they suffered, the judges awarded symbolic compensation amount of USD 250 
per victim as well as collective reparations in the form of support for housing, support for 
income-generating activities, education aid and psychological support. While reparations were 
ultimately not adopted in the Bemba case, a group of experts recommended to the Trial Chamber 
a mixture of individual and collective forms of reparations. They prioritised lifetime access to anti-
retroviral medication and food for victims of rape that had contracted HIV-AIDS, and a standard 
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reparations package consisting of a fixed compensation amount, an amount for sustainable 
livelihood assistance, for investing in a ‘kelemba’ – a type of micro-credit/savings system as well 
as an amount for moral damage. It was recommended that whether symbolic forms of reparations 
should be ordered and what they might entail should be revisited after material reparations were 
designed and delivered.66 
 
 3. The Trust Fund for Victims 
 
Article 79 of the ICC Statute indicates that ‘[a] Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the 
Assembly of States Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, 
and of the families of such victims.’  
Article 75 of the ICC Statute refers to the possibility for the Court to ‘order that the award 
for reparations be made through the Trust Fund’,67 and Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence explains the modalities for using the Trust Fund to allocate or distribute the reparations 
awards made by the Court to victims. Rule 98 explains the two principle roles of the Trust Fund: 
implementing reparations orders emanating from the Court and providing broader forms of 
assistance to victims and their families. These roles are furthered clarified in the Regulations of 
the Trust Fund.68 
 
a. Implementing orders from the Court 
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The Trust Fund is mandated to implement orders for reparation coming from the Court, when the 
Court requests it to do so. Rule 98, paragraph 2 provides that the Court may order that awards for 
reparations against a convicted person be deposited with the Trust Fund where at the time of 
making the order it is impossible or impracticable to make individual awards directly to each 
victim, whereas paragraphs 3 and 4 provide that awards for reparations be made through the Trust 
Fund, ‘where the number of the victims and the scope, forms and modalities of reparations makes 
a collective award more appropriate,’ or when made ‘to an intergovernmental, international or 
national organization approved by the Trust Fund.’  
 In practice, the implementation of Court-ordered reparations has not been smooth. The 
Trust Fund has been slow to come to grips with this work, which require a different skill set to its 
assistance work, more interaction with chambers and much less autonomy. Connected to this is 
some tension about authority and independence, and the control of the Trust Fund’s voluntary 
resources. It is clear that the Trust Fund operates within the context of the Court and in service of 
the overall reparative mandate of the ICC. Yet, the Trust Fund has discretion to determine how it 
uses the voluntary funds it collects.69 This discretion however, does not mean that it is simply a 
possible ‘implementing partner of the Court’70; it is formally mandated to implement the Court’s 
reparations orders.71 The Trust Fund is not empowered to reject the task of implementing the 
Court’s orders though it does control the use of its voluntary resources. Should it choose, the Trust 
Fund for Victims can apply a portion of its voluntary resources towards the implementation of a 
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reparations award against an indigent convicted perpetrator; however the Court does not have the 
power to oblige the Trust Fund for Victims to apply its voluntary resources in this way.72 This 
nuance of roles and responsibilities could have been better managed.  
 Also, various chambers have taken issue with the draft implementation plans prepared 
by the Trust Fund in response to reparations orders.  Particularly in the Lubanga and Al Mahdi 
cases, there has been a robust back and forth between the relevant chambers and the Trust Fund - 
the various chambers admonishing the Trust Fund for the lack of specificity of draft 
implementation plans, extensive delays or the failure to comply fully with Court orders,73 noting 
with overt frustration that ‘it is crucial for the TFV to act with due diligence in making judicial 
findings’, and that ‘these repeated failures to comply with the most basic requirements of a 
Chamber’s order suggest that the TFV has not yet gained command of its own mandate when 
operating within the judicial process.’74 In contrast, the Trust Fund has argued that the orders are 
impossible or overly burdensome to comply with, particularly on issues such as verification of 
individual beneficiaries.75 For instance, the Trust Fund has expressed deep concern about the 
Lubanga chambers’ approach to implementing collective reparations which ‘would be 
operationally and financially impossible for either the Trust Fund (or the Court) to manage and in 
addition would be very time consuming, further delaying the implementation of reparations.’76  
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  These battles of wills have contributed to the delay in the implementation of reparations 
orders, causing frustration and a sense of abandonment among victims.77 In the Lubanga case, one 
DRC organization assisting victims wrote to the Court in 2016, ‘It is obvious that the victims are 
tired of multiple interviews with NGOs and members of various services of the Court, without all 
this having brought results to date satisfying their expectations of reparation. They do not know 
what meaning to give to all these procedures which seem to them "endless".’78 
Over time, however, there appears to have developed a greater mutual understanding of 
roles and responsibilities. Also, the Trust Fund has progressively sought to collaborate on victim 
identification with the other bodies in the Court with relevant knowledge and experience in 
engaging victims - the VPRS, the Outreach section, and the Legal Representatives.79 In March 
2019, Trial Chamber VIII overseeing the implementation of the Al Mahdi reparations order noted 
that:  
 
the Chamber must recall that in the proceedings which preceded the DIP [Draft 
Implementation Plan] Decision it had frequent occasion to admonish the TFV for lack of 
diligence. The Chamber wishes to take this opportunity to commend the TFV for what is 
by all accounts a marked improvement in the UIP [Updated Implementation Plan]. The 
proposals are described in considerable detail, the relevant figures are explained and the 
document was submitted on time. The TFV’s efforts exemplify the high standard expected 
of them going forward.80 
 
                                                        
77 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, ‘Communication du Représentant légal relative aux vues et préoccupations des 
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Nevertheless, none of the cases that have reached the reparations implementation stage have been 
fully implemented. This is a problem.  
  
b. Implementing the assistance mandate 
 
In addition to its role to implement reparations orders when requested to do so by the Court, the 
Trust Fund can provide general assistance to victims and affected communities, using voluntary 
resources it collects.81 This possibility was intended to help avoid the situation of victims who 
required urgent assistance having to wait, sometimes for more than a decade, until the conclusion 
of a case, and also, to take into account the fact that Court-ordered reparations may not reach all 
victims in a particular situation.82  
In practise, the Trust Fund’s assistance has been an important way to get a modicum of 
support to victims. The assistance projects have, on the whole, been well-received where they have 
occurred. The challenges lie elsewhere.  
 
First, the Trust Fund’s activities have been relatively small-scale given the limited funds it 
has had access to do date. There is an obvious question about economies of scale; whether other 
development actors with access to much more significant pools of resources would be better placed 
to service the needs of victims in the communities where the Trust Fund operates.83  The Trust 
Fund has argued that its’ victim-centred approach is unique and in addition to identifying gaps that 
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need filling, it plays a catalytic role both in signposting the needs of victims in particular 
communities, bringing greater attention to those needs and helping those needs to be met – by its 
own funds, by the partnerships it fosters, and by others coming in to sustain the work.84 This is a 
particularly important role and when done successfully, a good way to make the Trust Fund’s 
interventions sustainable.  
Second, the Trust Fund has not been active in all situation countries. In principle, its 
mandate would allow it to provide support to natural persons and their families who have suffered 
harm as a result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, or 
organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their property which is 
dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic 
monuments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.85 This would 
include the following countries, all of which involve situations under investigation by the 
Prosecutor: Burundi, Georgia, Central African Republic, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Kenya, 
Darfur (Sudan), Uganda and DRC.86 The Trust Fund has been active in providing assistance in 
DRC and Uganda, and has indicated its intention to provide support in Cote d’Ivoire and Central 
African Republic. The Trust Fund announced its intention to speed up the launch of its assistance 
programmes in the Central African Republic following the acquittal of Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo,87 though at the time of writing more than one year later, programmes of assistance did not 
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appear to be close to starting. The security situation and limited funding are important barriers, 
however, transparency is also a problem. It is not always clear why assistance programmes have 
been started in some countries and not others. The discretion of the Trust Fund appears limitless 
and impossible for victims to challenge. This has angered many victims who have been unable to 
access support.88  
Third, an important part of the purpose of the assistance mandate as originally conceived 
was to ensure benefits for some of the most vulnerable victims with urgent needs that could not 
wait for the conclusion of a lengthy trial. The Trust Fund regulations require the Board of the Trust 
Fund to notify the Court before embarking on any activity or project to provide physical or 
psychological rehabilitation or material support for the benefit of victims and their families, in 
order to provide the Court with an opportunity to inform the Board if a particular project or activity 
would pre-determine any issue to be determined by the Court or be prejudicial to or inconsistent 
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.89 In order to avoid any perception of 
prejudice, however, the Trust Fund has given an extra wide berth to the Court and has avoided 
undertaking activity that addresses the needs of victims affected by ongoing Court proceedings. It 
has argued in one of its filings that: ‘assistance activities under the regulatory framework are 
prohibited from being related to a case, interfering with a case against an accused or with a legal 
issue in a case. Under the Court’s legal framework, assistance activities carried out under 
regulation 50 (a) of the Regulations of the Trust Fund cannot be associated with a case at the pre-
trial stage or while the trial proceedings are on-going. In the Trust Fund’s view, while the issue 
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has not yet been litigated before the Court, its assistance activities should also not, as a matter of 
policy, relate to any specific case at the post-conviction stage.’90 This, which goes well beyond the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the Trust Fund’s own regulations, produces the odd situation 
that if a Prosecutor decides to focus in on offences in village X, or particular crimes perpetrated 
by perpetrator Y, because of the gravity of those incidents and other related reasons, the Trust 
Fund would purposefully avoid providing assistance to the victims of those crimes, opting to 
support victims in other places, or of other crimes one step removed from the Prosecutor’s 
investigations. This policy choice arguably avoids all risk of potential prejudice,91 however it 
defeats one of the main purposes of the assistance mandate – to ensure victims get the support they 
need while waiting for the trials to conclude. As REDRESS has noted, ‘[w]hile the Trust Fund’s 
decision to commence its assistance mandate in CAR is generally applauded, concern has been 
expressed that it could have acted more proactively to mitigate the suffering of CAR victims 
pending a final determination on reparations.’92 Sehmi has argued similarly that ‘[i]t is not a 
morally supportable outcome that participating victims [like Ben] die waiting for justice because 
of concerns that providing urgent medical assistance would violate the presumption of innocence. 
There is a clear distinction between urgent assistance and court ordered reparations. Assistance 
includes a broad range of measures, such as medical assistance, housing etc., that are aimed at 
addressing the immediate needs of victims of mass atrocities in the aftermath of conflict.’93 While 
it is possible to imagine that there might be circumstances in which a grant of assistance might 
lead to real or perceived prejudice, those circumstances would be atypical. It is not appropriate or 
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necessary for the Trust Fund to discriminate against an entire, obviously relevant, category of 
persons requiring urgent assistance in order to avoid potential differences with chambers of the 
Court.  
 
E. The Need to Improve Effectiveness: Some Reflections 
 
1. The Meaning of Effectiveness  
 
Effectiveness has a plain-meaning and also a meaning in human rights law. The European Court 
of Human Rights has used the term to better understand the different positive obligations under 
the European Convention, intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but 
practical and effective.94 Many treaties recognise the right to an “effective remedy” for persons 
whose rights have been violated, which encompasses a variety of concepts including the right to a 
fair trial and the right to have access to court.95 Reparation is an important component of an 
effective remedy; ‘Without reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated, 
the obligation to provide an effective remedy, which is central to the efficacy of article 2, paragraph 
3, is not discharged.’96 An excessive length of proceedings has on occasion been determined to 
justify a finding of an absence of an effective remedy.97  
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The plain meaning of ‘effectiveness’ denotes the degree to which particular objectives are 
achieved, behaviours are changed and the extent to which targeted problems are managed and 
solved; the capacity to do or deliver what is supposed to be done or delivered.98 In organizational 
sciences, it has been argued that ‘relationships between structure and environment, design and 
innovation, or adaptation and uncertainty, for example, are important because their results lead 
ultimately to organizational effectiveness’.99 Thus, effectiveness should be judged not only on the 
innovations of structure, but on the capacity of an institution to adapt to meet challenges.  
Having in mind the need to improve effectiveness, the ICC Assembly of States Parties 
invited the Court to ‘intensify its efforts to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of proceedings 
including by adopting further changes of practice’ and ‘request[ed] the Court to intensify its efforts 
to develop qualitative and quantitative indicators that would allow the Court to demonstrate better 
its achievements and needs…’.100 The Court has begun to develop indicators to track its work,101 
though to date, there has been only limited consideration of what would constitute effective 
reparations. Consequently, the concept remains malleable and changeable depending on the 
perspectives of those carrying out the assessment, as is explained in the next section.  
 
2. Three frames of reference which underscore the complexity of perspectives on effectiveness 
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The ICC reparations regime is effective if it is capable of achieving its purpose within an 
appropriate time span. In a very basic sense the purpose of reparations before the ICC is to redress 
the harm suffered by victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. However, judgments 
of effectiveness are ‘based on the values and preferences individuals hold for a certain 
organization. The trouble with these values and preferences, however, is that they vary, and they 
are often contradictory among different constituencies.’102 
The effectiveness of ICC reparations can be understood through several frames of 
reference, in some combination:  
 
i) procedural or process matters: how lengthy, cumbersome is the process and how do 
the various persons involved in or affected by proceedings (including victims) 
experience the process including those with special needs or requirements;  
 
ii) substantive matters: whether reparations awards are targeted at appropriate and 
relevant persons and/or groups; whether the awards address the harms suffered by 
victims, were appropriate to the context and served their intended purposes; and  
 
iii) wider goals: whether reparations address the wider objectives under the ICC Statute 
including its preamble, contribute to victims’ transformation, reconcile communities 
and promote non-repetition.    
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Clearly these are simplified versions of more complex positions. Nevertheless, the three 
perspectives can help explain why and how different reparative visions impact on effectiveness 
and why it remains challenging to chart a common path forward. 
For some, questions of effectiveness should be assessed from the first perspective, 
sometimes with added criteria relating to costs. Some within this “camp” are likely to see 
reparations as important though secondary to the prosecutorial mandate of the Court; reparations 
are fine as an objective so long as they can be contained and do not detract from the primary 
mandate.103 Given the huge needs of victims, reparations could focus on more symbolic measures, 
which may acknowledge victims’ rights and needs but serve mainly as a catalyst for other actors 
to step in. Or, collective reparations could be privileged because they are perceived as simpler to 
implement, thus more efficient and also notionally capable of reaching a wider class of victims. 
Victims’ preferences are to be acknowledged but to some, they will be secondary to efficiency 
considerations.104 The beneficiary class could be limited to persons who submitted prior 
applications because it would cause too much delay to open the process to unidentified victims.105 
To others, victims’ experiences of the reparations process - particularly the need for victims’ voices 
to be heard, their priorities reflected and for the process to be expeditious - are crucial to this first 
frame of reference.106  
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For others, effectiveness should be assessed by both first and second frames of reference 
and the second frame will be narrowly focussed on the victims of crimes for which the perpetrator 
was convicted. There may be differences of perspective regarding how closely connected victims’ 
harms must be to the crimes, but essentially, there is an acceptance of the view that reparations is 
intended for victims of the crimes for which a perpetrator was convicted.107 Reparations should 
focus on what is appropriate to address the actual harm suffered by victims, and not be guided 
primarily by expediency.108 The victims’ legal representatives in the Katanga case underscore this 
point, arguing for practical measures closely connected to what the victims want and need: 
The victims have clearly stated what they are expecting in terms of reparations. Their 
expectations correspond to the distress that they have been enduring, which stems directly 
from the harm they suffered as a result of the crimes of which G. Katanga has been 
convicted. They are aware that full reparations for the harm they have suffered would 
probably be difficult to achieve, not only with regard to the nature of the harm suffered but 
also owing to budgetary constraints.  The victims of the attack on Bogoro of 24 February 
2003 need to be able to reconstruct and, in most cases, recover a decent standard of living. 
In the present case, the objectives of the reparation must be to enable the victims to ease 
the suffering caused by the attack. In order to give the reparations meaning and to spare 
the victims further frustration, the Chamber must draw a clear distinction between what it 
must order judicially in terms of reparations for the victims of the case and what it could 
recommend extrajudicially for other categories of victims or affected communities, if this 
is to be the case. Lastly, the Legal Representative wishes to recall that the victims in 
Katanga stated nonetheless that, should reparations ever be awarded to 
“[TRANSLATION] victims in general”, their tormentors could also become beneficiaries. 
Such a situation would prejudice the very objective of reparations.109 
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For others, the second frame of reference should be broadened to consider a wider 
constellation of victims connected to the crimes, not solely those that have sought to interact with 
the Court. For some, this will be a question of allowing for a wider causal link between the crimes 
for which the perpetrator was convicted and the harm suffered by victims.110 For instance, the 
Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice submitted that:  
Rape was an integral component of the conscription process for girl soldiers and sexual 
violence constituted an integral component to the crimes for which Mr Lubanga has been 
convicted. As such, reparations should not be limited to a narrow assessment of the harms 
attached to the charges, but should be inclusive of the breadth of harm suffered as a result 
of these crimes.111  
 
The third frame for some will be important but not directly relevant to any assessment of 
effectiveness (an added bonus of reparations but not the purpose of the ICC’s reparative mandate), 
whereas for others, the third frame is by far the most relevant reference. For instance, the Trust 
Fund, in some of its submissions, has focused on the importance of the reparative goals of 
reconciliation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.112  
 
b. The Court’s approach to effectiveness – where next 
 
Unsurprisingly, the Court has vacillated in its approach. Certain chambers have focused on the 
first frame of reference, and with time have mainly adopted a narrow vision of the second frame. 
Some chambers have incorporated into their discourse aspects of the third frame, though mainly 
to articulate broad principles, less so in the adoption of reparations orders and the approval of draft 
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implementation plans. An exception perhaps is the Al Mahdi case, where the chamber included the 
objective of non-repetition into its reparation order.113  
The fact that there are so many perspectives on the goals of the reparations process and 
consequently, the benchmarks for effectiveness, underscores why a meeting of the minds has been 
difficult to achieve.    
 
3. Article 21(3) of the Statute as a gauge for effectiveness 
 
Article 21(3) of the ICC Statute provides:  
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded 
on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, 
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth 
or other status.  
 
This provision requires the Court to interpret law consistently with internationally recognised 
human rights. In this section, it is argued that human rights should not only serve as the lens 
through which the ICC Statute and other applicable laws are applied and interpreted, it should also 
guide the ICC in its relationships with stakeholders (including victims) and help determine its goals 
and policies, particularly in relation to reparations.   
While important, it is unclear whether Article 21 requires the ICC qua institution, including 
its various organs, to respect the human rights of those persons impacted by its actions. The ICC 
is not a party to human rights treaties and thus it has not agreed to be bound by human rights 
provisions in the classic sense. Nevertheless, this does not prevent it from recognising that its 
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mandate has a direct impact on individuals’ human rights, and how it treats individuals in its charge 
is central to questions about the effectiveness of its work.  
Human rights is an increasingly important lens through which the work of international 
organisations can be assessed.114 In particular, institutions have been called upon to introduce or 
improve “due process” procedures to address perceived human rights deficiencies. For example, 
in a study commissioned by the UN Office of Legal Affairs relating to the individual sanctions 
regime of the UN Security Council, Professor Bardo Fassbender noted that ‘there is a legitimate 
expectation that the UN, through its organs, observes standards of due process, or “fair and clear 
procedures” on which the person concerned can rely.’115 He notes further that ‘[d]ependent on the 
circumstances of a particular situation, appropriate standards must be determined, suited to that 
situation, paying due regard to the nature of the affected rights and freedoms and the extent to 
which action taken by the UN is likely adversely to affect those rights and freedoms.’116 Similarly, 
in response to the perceived deficiencies of the UN response to allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse by international peacekeeping forces in Central African Republic, the group of experts 
appointed to carry out an independent review recommended that the UN adopt a human rights 
centred policy framework to address conflict related sexual violence by peacekeepers: ‘This 
shift in approach has important implications for the manner in which the UN responds to the 
needs of victims and conceives of its obligation to report, investigate and follow up on 
allegations.’117  
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International criminal courts and tribunals including the ICC, have long recognised the 
need for their procedures to respect the rights of the accused. The UN Secretary-General has 
stated that it ‘is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally 
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings.’118 
Recognised defence rights include the presumption of innocence, the right to know the charges, 
have the assistance of counsel, challenge the Prosecution evidence, present defence 
evidence, understand the proceedings and evidence, and remain silent, among other 
rights.119  
There is less clarity about the obligations of the ICC to uphold victims’ rights, including 
victims’ right to an effective remedy. Article 64(2) of the ICC Statute makes the distinction 
between the treatment of defence and victims’ rights, clear: ‘The Trial Chamber shall ensure that 
a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and 
due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses (emphasis added).’ It is recognised that 
victims and witnesses must be protected, but they are not recognised as rights holders in the same 
sense as accused persons; victims have certain procedural rights to participate and claim 
reparations, but the wider human rights that they might benefit from under domestic law or 
pursuant to human rights treaties, are not recognised specifically.  
Thus far, respect for human rights has not been included as part of the performance 
indicators developed by the Court.120 Nevertheless, it is argued that human rights is a crucial 
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indicator of effectiveness. Not only is recognising the inherent dignity and rights of all those who 
are affected by its work important in itself, it is also a clearer, less variable and arguably more 
neutral lens through which to observe the Court’s work and its reparations framework.  
Most relevant to victims’ rights before the ICC, under human rights law, there is an 
obligation on States to investigate and prosecute the most serious human rights abuses which 
constitute crimes under international law121 and victims are recognised to have a variety of 
procedural rights during the investigation and subsequently, such as the right to file a complaint, 
the right to receive information about the follow-up of the complaint, the right to some kind of 
administrative or judicial review upon a decision not to pursue an investigation or prosecution.122 
Victims and their families also have the right to know the truth about the abuses they suffered, 
including the identity of perpetrators and the causes that gave rise to the violations.123  
 
a. Key human rights principles relevant to the effectiveness of reparations before the ICC 
  
i. Timeliness of reparations 
 
To promote efficiency and effectiveness, the ICC should put in place measures to ensure a speedy 
trial – not only to guarantee defence rights, but also in recognition of victims’ right to an effective 
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remedy without delay, including reparations.124 In Ivanov v. Ukraine, which concerned the failure 
to enforce in a timely way a lump-sum retirement payment and compensation award, the 
ECtHR determined that the right to court would be illusory if Ukraine allowed a final, binding 
judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party. ‘The effective access to 
court includes the right to have a court decision enforced without undue delay.’ How long a 
delay is too long depends on ‘the applicant’s own behaviour and that of the competent 
authorities, and the amount and nature of the court award.’125  
Under a human rights performance framework, reparations would be ineffective if 
implementation was unduly delayed. This would change the narrative in an important way. It is 
not just ‘unfortunate’ that the process is taking so long; it would be a breach of the Court’s 
commitment to ensure victims’ rights and the Court would be required to take adequate steps to 
rectify the breach – there is an obligation to make the process work for victims.  
 
ii. Victims’ ability to express views and concerns about reparations, and for these to be taken 
into account 
 
Surely, under Article 68(3) of the ICC Statute, victims can participate in proceedings that affect 
them, including reparations proceedings. However, engagement in reparations proceedings 
involves not only the ability to input into legal proceedings but to engage effectively with those 
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developing and implementing reparations and assistance programmes.126 This requires two-way 
discussions and a need for those in the Court and the Trust Fund to be accountable to victims for 
the decisions they take. The Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and 
Reparations underscores the need for consultation and engagement with victims throughout the 
reparations process; this is about recognising victims’ agency and supporting their empowerment:   
‘Processes must empower women and girls, or those acting in the best interests of girls, to 
determine for themselves what forms of reparation are best suited to their situation. …   Full 
participation of women and girls victims should be guaranteed in every stage of the 
reparation process, i.e. design, implementation, evaluation, and decision-making.’127  
 
iii. The process should be conducted in such a way so as to guarantee the dignity, security and 
privacy of victims.  
 
Victims must be treated with humanity and dignity128 and their privacy and safety, both 
physical and psychological, must be safeguarded.129 The connection between excessive 
length of reparations proceedings and the need to treat victims with humanity and dignity 
must be underscored.   
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iv. Reparations awards should as far as possible, address the particular harms suffered by 
victims. They should be adequate and effective.    
 
Human rights treaties recognise that reparations should be fair, adequate or effective, used 
either singly or grouped together appropriate, proportionate to the harm and equitable. 130  
More simplified approaches tend to be taken when there is a large number of injured 
individuals who would be entitled to significant reparation that would be overwhelming for a 
court to adjudicate claim by claim, and/or when the nature of the violations is such that victims 
would not have the requisite proof to satisfy a court of their injuries using typical standards of 
proof.131 Nevertheless, simplified procedures should to the greatest possible extent, seek to address 
the particular harms suffered by victims.  
ICC chambers have incorporated many of these concepts into reparations principles they 
have adopted in particular cases, however the degree to which the awards meet these objectives – 
key indicators of effectiveness – is not tracked by performance indicators, nor necessarily in the 
draft implementation plans prepared by the Trust Fund. Instead, the Court and Trust Fund appear 
in some instances to have relied on the need for simplified procedures to exempt themselves from 
addressing the requirement for reparations to be proportionate to the harm.  
 
E. Conclusion 
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Despite the structural challenges inherent to the ICC Statute, there is much more the Court can do 
to make reparations effective. But effectiveness should not be conflated with or sacrificed for 
efficiency measures. These include marginalising victim’s voices, arbitrarily cutting off who can 
benefit or arbitrarily privileging collective or symbolic reparations for perceived reasons of 
efficiency in those instances when these measures don’t align with victims’ own priorities for 
addressing their harms.  
Greater harmonisation of approaches between chambers will help to promote efficient, 
predictable and fairer processes. This requires more cohesion on the Court’s vision for reparations 
and a commitment of all the principle organs, as well as the Trust Fund, to implementing a common 
vision.  There is a need to maximise victims’ access to the procedure and ultimately to reparations 
which address as much as possible to the specificity of the harms they experienced, while at the 
same time simplifying and thereby reducing the time and cost of the process. In particular, there 
is a need to continue to streamline those procedures that do not directly impact on the rights of the 
defence (including the determination of those reparations awards that will ultimately be 
implemented through the voluntary resources of the Trust Fund).132  
I have argued that the Court should be seeking to award and deliver “effective reparations” 
which should be interpreted in line with human rights principles relating to effective remedy. 
While the ICC is not a human rights Court per se, it should be seeking to uphold the fundamental 
rights of all persons who come within its sphere of activity. This should apply not only to accused 
persons, but also to victims who are key stakeholders. Greater accountability of the ICC would be 
a clear way in which to garner greater respect for the rights of the individuals and groups who are 
relying upon it for a modicum of justice for all they suffered. 
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Victims should be consulted and involved in all stages of the reparations process – not only 
as participants in proceedings which affect their interests, but in the development and 
implementation of assistance projects and reparations awards. Lines of communication should be 
open to facilitate such consultation, and to promote accountability and transparency.  
